Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- Part I. Stability and the foundations of political liberalism -- Justificatory stability -- Hobbesian political liberalism -- Motivating liberal loyalty -- Part II. Justificatory stability and the law of religion -- Conflicts of loyalty in religion and law -- Religious exemptions as a mechanism for political stability -- Endorsement, entanglement, and religious neutrality -- Conclusion.

"This book argues that the principles and institutions of political liberalism are necessary conditions for achieving reliable stability amid conditions of pluralism. Only a political system of this sort can bring citizens' moral, religious, and political loyalties into robust agreement. Through an analysis that encompasses normative political theory and American constitutional law, David Golemboski illustrates the implications of this conclusion by examining contemporary legal debates in law and religion. By developing a fresh perspective on how legal frameworks for religious exercise and establishment can ameliorate conflict and enhance the stability of a liberal constitution, this book demonstrates that political systems need not subordinate or sacrifice important liberal priorities in favor of stability. Rather, those liberal priorities are themselves necessary components of a stable order. Religious Pluralism and Political Stability will be of interest to scholars across the fields of political philosophy, legal theory, and constitutional law who have an interest in religion"--

Embedded in U.S. legal frameworks governing the free exercise of religion is a criterion that has received surprisingly little theoretical attention: sincerity. Only those professions of belief that are sincere warrant legal accommodation. Nearly all of the existing literature on sincerity focuses on judicial "tests," or evidentiary frameworks, for judging sincerity. This paper, in contrast, interrogates the notion of sincerity itself, developing a conception of what properly constitutes a sincere profession of belief. That conception includes three elements: genuineness, nonopportunism, and intelligibility. I then consider a fourth potential component of sincerity, vigilance, which concerns a believer's consistency in living in accordance with their belief. A number of authors have recently proposed judicial tests requiring some sufficient degree of vigilance, but I argue that a vigilance criterion is incompatible with the fundamental values and objectives that underwrite the commitment to religious liberty in liberal political orders.

Amartya Sen has argued that contractarian theories of justice inevitably fall victim to the problem of parochialism, for the reason that they rely on a problematically narrow conception of impartiality. Sen finds a corrective model of impartiality in Adam Smith's figure of the impartial spectator. In this essay, I argue that Sen's invocation of the spectator to resolve the problem of parochialism is unfounded, as the impartial spectator is fundamentally a product of socialization that serves to propagate conventional moral norms. I consider various interpretive avenues for "rescuing" the spectator from parochialism, and ultimately conclude that a minor amendment to Smith's account, resting on the possibility of a conscience informed by moral pluralism, is required.